Many real-world networks such as social networks consist of strategic agents. The topology of these networks often plays a crucial role in determining the ease and speed with which certain information driven tasks can be accomplished. Consequently, growing a stable network having a certain desired topology is of interest. Motivated by this, we study the following important problem: given a certain desired topology, under what conditions would best response link alteration strategies adopted by strategic agents, uniquely lead to formation of a stable network having the given topology. This problem is the inverse of the classical network formation problem where we are concerned with determining stable topologies, given the conditions on the network parameters. We study this interesting inverse problem by proposing (1) a recursive model of network formation and (2) a utility model that captures key determinants of network formation. Building upon these models, we explore relevant topologies such as star graph, complete graph, bipartite Turán graph, and multiple stars with interconnected centers. We derive a set of sufficient conditions under which these topologies uniquely emerge, study their social welfare properties, and investigate the effects of deviating from the derived conditions.
Introduction
A primary reason for networks such as social networks to be formed is that every person (or agent or node) gets certain benefits from the network. These benefits assume different forms in different types of networks. These benefits, however, do not come for free. Every benefit that it gets from each node that is at distance two from it, and c be the cost it pays for maintaining link with each of its direct neighbors. In real-world networks, it is often the case that 0 ≤ b 2 ≤ b 1 and c ≥ 0. The list of relations, say (1) 0 < b 2 < b 1 and (2) b 1 − b 2 < c < b 1 , are the conditions on the network. Based on these conditions, the utilities of the involved nodes are determined, which in turn affect their (link addition/deletion) strategies, hence influencing the process of formation of that network. Throughout this paper, we ignore enlisting trivial conditions such as 0 ≤ b 2 ≤ b 1 and c ≥ 0.
In general, the evolution of a real-world social network would depend on several other factors such as the information diffusing through the network [8, 36] . For simplicity, we make a well accepted assumption that the network evolves purely based on the conditions on it and does not depend on any other factor. In general, if the information received by any node is required to be propagated throughout the network within a certain number of steps d, the network's diameter should be bounded by the number d. Consider a different scenario where the time required to spread the information is critical, but there is also a need for moderation to verify the authenticity of the information before spreading it to the other nodes in the network (for example, it could be a rumor). Here a star network (Figure 1(a) ) would be desirable since the center would act as a moderator and any information that originates in any part of the network has to flow through the moderator before it reaches other nodes in the network. Virus inoculation is a related example where a star network would be desirable since vaccinating the center may be sufficient to prevent spread of the virus to other parts of the network, thus reducing the cost of vaccination.
Our next example concerns two sections of a society where some or all members of a section receive certain information simultaneously. The objective here is to forward the information to the other section. Moreover, it is desirable to not have intra-section links to save on resources. In this case, it would be desirable to have a bipartite network. Moreover, if the information is critical and urgent, requiring redundancy, a complete bipartite network would be desirable. A bipartite Turán network (Figure 1(c) ) is a practical special case where both sections are required to be nearly of equal sizes.
Consider a generalization of the star network where there are k centers and the leaf nodes are evenly distributed among them, that is, the difference between the number of leaf nodes connected to any two centers, is at most one. Such a network would be desirable when the number of nodes is expected to be very large and there is a need for decentralization for efficiently controlling information in the network. We call such a network, k-star network (Figures 1(d-e) ).
For similar reasons, if fast information extraction is the main criterion, certain topologies may be better than others. Information extraction in social networks can be thought of as the reverse of information diffusion. Also, an information extraction or search algorithm would work better on some topologies than others.
The problem under study also assumes importance in knowledge management. McInerney [25] defines knowledge management as an effort to increase useful knowledge within an organization, and highlights that the ways to do this include encouraging communication, offering opportunities to learn, and promoting the sharing of appropriate knowledge artifacts. An organization may want to develop a particular network within, so as to make the most of knowledge management. A complete network would be desirable if the nodes are trustworthy with no possibility of manipulation. For practical reasons, an organization may want nodes of different sections to communicate with each other and not within sections so that each node can aggregate knowledge received from nodes belonging to the other section, in its own way. A bipartite Turán network would be desirable in such a case. Such a network may also be more desirable than the complete network in order to prevent inessential investment of time for communication within a section.
Similarly, for a variety of reasons, there may be a need to form networks having certain other structural properties. So depending on the tasks for which the network would be used, a certain topology might be more desirable than others. This provides the motivation for our work.
Relevant Work
Models of network formation in literature can be broadly classified as either simultaneous move models or sequential move models. Jackson and Wolinsky [21] propose a simultaneous move game model where nodes simultaneously propose the set of nodes with whom they want to create a link, and a link is created between any two nodes if they mutually propose a link to each other. Aumann and Myerson [3] provide a sequential move game model where nodes are farsighted, whereas Watts [31] considers a sequential move game model where nodes are myopic. In both of these approaches and in any sequential network formation model in general, the resulting network is based on the ordering in which links are altered and owing to the assumed random ordering, it is not clear which networks would emerge.
The modeling of strategic formation in a general network setting was first studied by Jackson and Wolinsky [21] by proposing a utility model called symmetric connections model. This widely cited model, however, does not capture many key determinants involved in strategic network formation. Since then, several utility models have been proposed in literature in the effort of capturing these determinants. Jackson [16] reviews several such models in the literature and highlights that pairwise stable networks may not exist in some settings. Hellmann and Staudigl [13] provide a survey of random graph models and game theoretic models for analyzing network evolution.
Given a network, Myerson value [27] gives an allocation to each of the involved nodes based on certain desirable properties. Jackson [17] proposes a family of allocation rules that consider alternative network structures when allocating the value generated by the network to the individual nodes. Narayanam and Narahari [28] investigate the topologies of networks formed with a generic model based on value functions and analyze resulting networks using Myerson value. There have also been studies on stability and efficiency of specific networks such as R&D networks [24] . Atalay [2] studies sources of variation in social networks by extending the model in [15] by allowing agents to have varying abilities to attract contacts.
Goyal and Joshi [11] explore two specific models of network formation and arrive at circumstances under which networks exhibit an unequal distribution of connections across agents. Goyal and Vega-Redondo [12] propose a non-cooperative game model capturing bridging benefits wherein they introduce the concept of essential nodes, which is a part of our proposed utility model. Their model, however, does not capture the decaying of benefits obtained from remote nodes. Kleinberg et al. [23] propose a localized model that considers benefits that a node gets by bridging any pair of its neighbors separated by a path of length 2. Their model does not capture indirect benefits and bridging benefits that nodes can gain by being intermediaries between non-neighbors which are separated by a path of length greater than 2. Under another localized model where a node's bridging benefits depend on its clustering coefficient, Vallam et al. [30] study stable and efficient topologies.
Hummon [14] uses agent-based simulation approaches to explore the dynamics of network evolution based on the symmetric connections model. Doreian [7] , given some conditions on a network, analytically arrives at specific networks that are pairwise stable using the same model. However, the complexity of analysis increases exponentially with the number of nodes and the analysis in the paper is limited to a network with only five nodes. Some gaps in this analysis are addressed by Xie and Cui [33, 34] .
Most existing models of social network formation assume that all nodes are present throughout the evolution of a network, thus allowing nodes to form links that may be inconsistent with the desired network. For instance, if the desired topology is a star, it is desirable to have conditions that ensure a link between two nodes, of which one would play the role of the center. But with the same conditions, links between other pairs would be created with high probability, leading to inconsistencies with the star topology. Also, with all nodes present in an unorganized network, a random ordering over them in sequential network formation models adds to the complexity of analysis. However, in most social networks, not all nodes are present from beginning itself. A network starts building up from a few nodes and gradually grows to its full form. Our model captures such a type of network formation.
There have been a few approaches earlier to design incentives for nodes so that the resulting network is efficient. Woodard and Parkes [32] use mechanism design to ensure that the outcome is an efficient network. Mutuswami and Winter [26] design a mechanism that ensures efficiency, budget balance, and equity. Though it is often assumed that the welfare of a network is based only on its efficiency, there are many situations where this may not be true. A network may not be efficient in itself, but it may be desirable for reasons external to the network, as explained in Section 2.
Contributions of this Paper
In this paper, we study the inverse of the classical network formation problem, that is, under what conditions would the desired topology uniquely emerge when agents adopt their best response strategies. Our specific contributions are summarized below.
• We propose a recursive model of network formation, with which we can guarantee that a network being formed retains a designated topology in each of its stable states. Our model ensures that, for common network topologies, the analysis can be carried out independent of the current number of nodes in the network and also independent of the upper bound on the number of nodes in the network. The utility model we propose captures most key aspects relevant to strategic network formation: (a) benefits from immediate neighbors, (b) costs of maintaining links with immediate neighbors, (c) benefits from indirect neighbors, (d) bridging benefits, (e) intermediation rents, and (f) an entry fee for entering the network. We then present our procedure for deriving sufficient conditions for the formation of a given topology as the unique one. (Section 5)
• Using the proposed models, we study common and important networks, namely, star network, complete network, bipartite Turán network, and k-star network, and derive sufficient conditions under which these topologies uniquely emerge. We also investigate the efficiency (or social welfare) properties of the above network topologies. (Section 6)
• We introduce the concept of dynamic conditions on a network and study the effects of deviation from the derived sufficient conditions on the resulting network, using the notion of graph edit distance. In this process, we develop a polynomial time algorithm for computing graph edit distance between a given graph and a corresponding k-star graph. (Section 7)
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first detailed effort in investigating the problem of obtaining a desired topology uniquely in social network formation.
The Model
We consider the process of formation of a network consisting of strategic nodes, where each node aims at maximizing its utility it gets from the network.
A Recursive Model of Network Formation
The network consists of n nodes at any given time, where n could vary over time. The process starts with one node, whose only strategy is to remain in its current state. The strategy of the second node is to either (a) not enter the network or (b) propose a link with the first node. We make a natural assumption that in order to be a part of the network, the second node has to propose a link with the first node and not vice versa. Based on the model under study, the first node may or may not get to decide whether to accept this link. If this link is created, the second node successfully enters the network. Following this, the network evolves to reach a stable state after which, the third node considers entering the network. The third node can enter the network by successfully creating link(s) with one or both of the first two nodes. In this paper, we consider that at most one link is altered at a time, and so the third node can enter the network by successfully creating a link with exactly one of the already present nodes in the network. If it does, the network of these three nodes evolves. Once the network reaches a stable state, the fourth node considers entering the network, and this process continues. Note that in the above process, no node in the network of n − 1 nodes can create a link with the newly entering n th node until the latter proposes and successfully creates a link in order to enter the network. After the new node enters the network successfully, the network evolves until it reaches a stable state consisting of n nodes. Following this, a new (n + 1) th node considers entering the network and the process goes on recursively. The assumption that a node considers entering the network only when it is stable may seem unnatural in general networks, but can be justified in networks where entry of nodes can be controlled by a network administrator. This recursive model is depicted in Figure 2 . Note that the model is not based on any utility model, network evolution model, or equilibrium notion.
It can be observed at first glance that, if at some point of time, a new node fails to enter the network by failing to create a link with some existing node, the network will cease to grow. In such cases, it may seem that Figure 2 goes into infinite loop for no reason, while it may have just pointed to an exit. The argument holds for the current social network models where the cost and benefit parameters, and hence the conditions on the network, are assumed to remain unchanged throughout the network formation process. But in realworld networks, this is often not the case and the conditions may vary over time or evolve owing to some internal or external factors. For instance, if the individual workload on the employees increases, the cost of maintaining link with each other also increases. On the other hand, if the workload is of collaborative nature, then the benefit parameters attain an increased value. It is possible that no node successfully enters the network for some time, but with changes in the conditions, nodes may resume entering and the network may start to grow again. We explore this concept of dynamic conditions on a network in Section 7.
Dynamics of Network Evolution
The model of network evolution considered in this paper is based on a sequential move game [31] . During the evolution phase, nodes which get to make a move are chosen at random at all time. Each node has a set of strategies at any given time and when it gets a chance to make a move, it chooses its myopic best response strategy which maximizes its immediate utility. A strategy can be of one of the three types, namely (a) creating a link with a node that is not its immediate neighbor, (b) deleting a link with an immediate neighbor, or (c) maintaining status quo. Note that a node will compute whether a link it proposes, decreases utility of the other node, because if it does, it is not its myopic best response as the link will not be accepted by the latter. Moreover, consistent with the notion of pairwise stability, if a node gets to make a move and altering a link does not strictly increase its utility, then it prefers not to alter it. The aforementioned sequential move evolution process can be represented as an extensive form game tree.
Game Tree
The entry of each node in the network results in one game tree, and so the network formation process results in a series of game trees, each tree corresponding to a sequential move game (see Figure 4 ). Each branch represents a possible transition from a network state, owing to decision made by a node. So, the root of a game tree represents the network state in which a new node considers entering the network.
A way to find an equilibrium in an extensive form game consisting of farsighted players, is to use backward induction [29] . However, in our game, the players have bounded rationality, that is, their best response strategies are myopic. So instead of the regular backward induction approach or the bottom-up approach, we take a top-down approach for ease of understanding. We now recall the definition of an improving path [20] .
Definition 3 An improving path is a sequence of networks, where each transition is obtained by either any two nodes choosing to add a mutual link or any node choosing to delete any of its links.
Thus, a pairwise stable network is one from which there is no improving path leaving it. The notion of improving paths is based on the assumption of myopic agents, who make their decisions without considering how their actions affect the decisions of other nodes and hence the evolution of the network.
Notion of Types
As the order in which nodes take decisions is random, in a general game, the number of branches arising from each state in the game tree depends on the number of nodes, n, as well as the number of possible direct connections each node can be involved in (or number of possible direct connections with respect to each node), n − 1. The complexity of analysis can, however, be significantly reduced by the notion of types using which, several nodes and links can be analyzed at once. This is a widely used technique in analyzing pairwise stability of a network. We now explain the notion of types in detail.
Definition 4
Two nodes A and C of a graph g are of the same type if there exists an automorphism f : V (g) → V (g) such that f (A) = C, where V (g) is the vertex set of g.
The implication of nodes being of the same type is that, for any automorphism f , if a best response strategy of node A is to alter its link with node D, then a best response strategy of f (A) is to alter its link with f (D). So at any point of time, it is sufficient to consider the best response strategies of one node of each type.
Definition 5 Two connections with respect to a node B, connections BA and BC, are of the same type if there exists an automorphism f such that f (A) = C and f (B) = B.
The implication of connections being of the same type with respect to a node is that, the node is indifferent between the connections, irrespective of the underlying utility model. Different types of connections with respect to a node form different branches in the game tree. For example, in Figure 3 , nodes G and H are of the same type. Also, the two possible connections M G and M H with respect to node M , are of the same type. But the possible connections EG and EH with respect to node E, are not of the same type. So, these two strategies of node E, namely, connecting with node G and connecting with node H, form different branches in the game tree, implying that the utilities arising from these two types of connections are not necessarily equal.
Directing Network Evolution
Our procedure for deriving sufficient conditions for the formation of a given topology as the unique topology, is modeled on the lines of mathematical induction. Consider a base case network with very few nodes (two in our analysis). We derive conditions so that the network formed with these few nodes has the desired topology. Then using induction, we assume that a network with n − 1 nodes has the desired topology, and derive conditions so that, the network with n nodes, also has that topology. Without loss of generality, we explain this procedure with the example of star topology, referring to the game tree in Figure 4 . Assuming that the network formed with n − 1 nodes is a star, our objective is to derive conditions so that the network of n nodes is also a star.
In Figure 4 , at the root of the game tree, node A is the newly entering n th node and the network is in state 0, where a star with n − 1 nodes is already formed. Recall that the complexity of analyzing a network depends on the number of different types of nodes as well as the number of different types of possible connections with respect to a node in that network. Note that in state 0, with respect to node A, there are two types of possible connections: (a) with the center and (b) with a leaf node. In states 1, 3, 4 and 5, there are two types of nodes, and two types of possible connections with respect to a leaf node and one with respect to the center. It will be seen that, the network is directed to not enter state 2, so even though there are four types of nodes in that state, it is not a matter of concern.
Let u j (s) be the utility of node j when the network is in state s. In state 0, as the newly entering node A gets to make the first move, we want it to connect to the center by choosing the improving path that transits from state 0 to state 1. So utility of node A in state 1 should be greater than that in state 0, that is, u A (1) > u A (0). Similarly, for node B to accept the link from node A, B's utility should not decrease, that is u B (1) ≥ u B (0). We do not want node A to connect to any of the leaf nodes, that is, we do not want the network to enter state 2. Note that as we are interested in sufficient conditions, we are not concerned if there exists an improving path from state 2 that eventually results in a star (we discard state 2 in order to shorten the analysis). One way to ensure that the network does not enter state 2, irrespective of whether it lies on an improving path, is by making it less favorable for node A than the desired state 1, that is, u A (2) < u A (1). Another way to ensure the same is by a condition for a leaf node such that, accepting a link from node A decreases its utility, and so the leaf node does not accept the link, thus forcing node A to connect to the center. That is, u j (2) < u j (0) for any leaf node j. Thus the network enters state 1, which is our desired state. To ensure pairwise stability of our desired state, no improving paths should lead out of it, for which we need to consider two cases. First, when node B gets to make its move, it should not break any of its links (state 5), that is u B (1) ≥ u B (5). Second, when any of the leaf nodes is chosen at random, it should neither create a link with some other leaf node (state 3), nor delete its link with the center (state 4). The corresponding conditions are u j (1) ≥ u j (3) and u j (1) ≥ u j (4) for any leaf node j.
Thus we direct the network evolution along a desired improving path by imposing a set of conditions, ensuring that the resulting network is in the desired state or has the desired topology uniquely. In the evolution process of a network consisting of homogeneous nodes, the number of branches from a state of the game tree depends on the number of different types of nodes and the number of different types of possible connections with respect to a node, at that particular instant. As we are primarily interested in the formation of special topologies in a recursive manner (nodes are already organized according to the topology and the objective is to extend the topology to that with one more node, so the existing nodes play the same role as before, and most or all of the existing links do not change), the number of different types of nodes as well as the number of different types of possible connections with respect to a node, are small constants at any instant, thus simplifying the analysis.
The Utility Model
Keeping in view the necessity of solving the problem in a setting that reflects real-world networks in a reasonably general way, we propose a utility model that captures several key determinants of social network formation. In particular, our model is a considerable generalization of the extensively explored symmetric connections model [21] and also builds upon other well known models in literature [12, 23] . Furthermore, as nodes have global knowledge of existing nodes in the network while making their decisions (for instance, proposing a link with a faraway node), we propose a utility model that captures the global view of indirect and bridging benefits.
Definition 6 [12]
A node j is said to be essential for nodes y and z if j lies on every path joining y and z.
Whenever nodes y and z are directly connected, they get the entire benefits arising from the direct link. On the other hand, when they are indirectly connected with the help of other nodes, of which at least one is essential, y and z lose some fraction of the benefits arising from their communication, in the form of intermediation rents paid to the essential nodes without whom the communication is infeasible.
Let E(x, y) be the set of essential nodes connecting nodes y and z. The model proposed by Goyal and Vega-Redondo [12] suggests that the benefits produced by y and z be divided in a way that x, y, and the nodes in E(x, y) get fraction
each. However, in practice, if nodes y and z can communicate owing to the essential nodes connecting them, that pair would want to enjoy at least some fraction of the benefits obtained from each other, since that pair is the real producer of these benefits (and possess human characteristics such as ego and prestige). That is, the pair would not agree to give away more than some fraction, say γ, to the corresponding set of essential nodes. As this fact is known to all nodes, in particular, to the set of essential nodes, they as a whole will charge the pair exactly γ fraction as intermediation rents. As each essential node in the set is equally important for making the communication feasible, it is reasonable to assume that the intermediation rents are equally divided among them.
It can be noted that nodes which lie on every shortest path connecting y and z, but are not essential for connecting them, also have bargaining power, since without them, the indirect benefits obtained from the communication would be less. And so, they should get some fraction proportional to their differential contribution, that is, the indirect benefits produced through the shortest path minus the indirect benefits produced through the second shortest path. But, for simplicity of analysis, we ignore this differential contribution and assume that nodes that lie on path(s) connecting y and z, but are not essential, do not get any share of the intermediation rents. So, when y and z are indirectly connected with the help of other nodes of which none is essential, they get the entire indirect benefits arising from their communication.
We now describe the determinants of network formation that our model captures, and thus obtain expression for the utility function. Let N be the set of nodes present in the given network, d j be the degree of node j, l(j, w) be the shortest path distance between nodes j and w, b i be the benefit obtained from a node at distance i in absence of rents (assume b ∞ = 0), and c be the cost for maintaining link with an immediate neighbor.
(1) Network Entry Fee: Since nodes enter a network one by one, we introduce the notion of network entry fee. This fee corresponds to some cost a node has to bear in order to be a part of the network. It is clear that, if a newly entering node wants its first connection to be with an existing node which is of high importance or degree, then it has to spend more time or effort. So we assume the entry fee that the former pays to be an increasing function of the latter's degree, say d T . For simplicity of analysis, we assume the fee to be directly proportional to d T and call the proportionality constant, network entry factor c 0 .
(2) Direct Benefits: These benefits are obtained from immediate neighbors in a network. For a node j, these benefits equal b 1 times d j .
(3) Link Costs: These costs are the amount of resources like time, money, and effort a node has to spend in order to maintain links with its immediate neighbors. For a node j, these costs equal c times d j .
(4) Indirect Benefits: These benefits are obtained from indirect neighbors, and these decay with distance (b i+1 < b i ). In the absence of rents, the total indirect benefits that a node j gets is w∈N, l(j,w)>1 b l(j,w) .
(5) Intermediation Rents: Nodes pay a fraction γ (0 ≤ γ < 1) of the indirect benefits, in the form of additional favors or monetary transfers to the corresponding set of essential nodes, if any. The loss incurred by a node j due to these rents is w∈N, E(j,w) =φ γb l(j,w) .
(6) Bridging Benefits: Consider a node j ∈ E(y, z). Both y and z benefit b l(y,z) each and so this indirect connection produces a total benefit of 2b l(y,z) . As described earlier, each node from the set E(y, z) gets a fraction γ |E(y,z)| , the absolute benefits being γ |E(y,z)| 2b l(y,z) . So the bridging benefits obtained by a node j from the entire network is j∈E(y,z), {y,z}⊆N
The utility of a node j is a function of the network, that is, u j : g → R. We drop the notation g from the following equation for readability. Summing up all the aforementioned determinants of network formation that our model captures, we get
where T(j) is the node to which node j connects to enter the network, and I {j=NE} is 1 when j is a newly entering node about to create its first link, else it is 0.
Analysis of Relevant Topologies
Using the proposed model of recursive and sequential network formation and the proposed utility model, we provide sufficient conditions under which several relevant network topologies, namely star, complete graph, bipartite Turán graph, 2-star, and k-star, uniquely emerge as pairwise stable networks. Note that as the conditions derived for any particular topol-ogy are sufficient, there may exist alternative conditions that result in the same topology uniquely.
Sufficient Conditions for the Formation of Relevant Topologies Uniquely
We use Equation (1) for mathematically deriving the conditions.
, the unique resulting topology is star.
Proof Refer to Figure 4 throughout the proof. For the base case of n = 2, the requirement for the second node to propose a link to the first is that its utility should become strictly positive. Also as the first node has degree 0, there is no entry fee.
Now, consider a star consisting of n − 1 nodes. Let the newly entering n th node get to make a decision of whether to enter the network. For n ≥ 3, if the entering node connects to the center, it gets indirect benefits of b 2 each from n − 2 nodes. But as the center is essential for enabling communication between newly entering node and other leaf nodes, the new node has to pay γ fraction of these benefits to the center. Also, it has to pay an entry fee of (n − 2)c 0 as the degree of center is n − 2. So in Figure 4 ,
As it needs to be true for all n ≥ 3, we set the condition to c < min
The last step is obtained so that the condition for link cost is independent of the upper limit on the number of nodes, by enforcing
which enables us to substitute n = 3 and the condition holds for all n ≥ 3. For the center to accept a link from the newly entering node, we need to have u B (0) ≤ u B (1). For n = 2, the requirement for the first node to accept link from the second node is 0 ≤ b 1 −c which is satisfied by Inequality (2). For n = 3, as the center is essential for connecting the other two nodes separated by distance two, it gets γ fraction of b 2 from both the nodes. So it gets bridging benefits of 2γb 2 .
This condition is satisfied by Inequality (2). For n ≥ 4, prior to entry of the new node, the center alone bridged n − 2 2 pairs of nodes at distance two from each other, while after connecting with the new node, the center is the sole essential node for n − 1 2 such pairs.
So the required condition:
This condition is satisfied by Inequality (2) for all n ≥ 4. For the newly entering node to prefer the center over a leaf node as its first connection (not applicable for n = 2 and 3), we need u A (1) > u A (2).
Alternatively, the newly entering node may want to connect to the leaf node, but the leaf node's utility decreases. In that case, the alternative condition can be u j (2) < u j (0) for j = C, D, E, F . Note that this leaf node gets bridging benefits of 2γb 2 for being essential for indirectly connecting the new node with the center. Also, as it is one of the two essential nodes for indirectly connecting the new node with the other n − 3 leaf nodes (the other being the center), it gets bridging benefits of (n − 3)(
which gives c > b 1 + 2γb 2 + (n − 3)γb 3 . But this is inconsistent with the condition in Inequality (2) . So in order to ensure that the newly entering node connects to the center and not to any of the leaf nodes, we use Inequality (5). Now that a star of n nodes is formed, we ensure its pairwise stability by deriving conditions for the same. Firstly, we ensure that the center does not delete any of its links. So we need u B (1) ≥ u B (5). Note that from the center's point of view, state 5 is same as state 0 and as we have seen earlier that u B (0) ≤ u B (1), the required condition u B (5) ≤ u B (1) is already ensured. Next, no two leaf nodes should form a link between them. So we should ensure that, not creating a link between them is at least as good for them as creating, that is u j (1) ≥ u j (3) for any leaf node j. This condition is applicable for n ≥ 3.
For a leaf node to not delete its link with the center, we need u j (1) ≥ u j (4) for any leaf node j. For n ≥ 2, we have
which is a weaker condition than Inequality (2) for n ≥ 2.
Note that Inequalities (2) and (5) put together are stronger than Inequalities (3) and (4) combined. We get the required result using Inequalities (2), (5) and (6) .
We provide the proofs of the remaining results of this section in Appendices A through E. Proposition 3 For a network with γ <
, the unique resulting topology is bipartite Turán graph.
Proposition 4 Let σ be the upper bound on the number of nodes that can enter the network and λ = σ 2
and b 1 − b 2 + γb 2 + γλ ≤ c < b 1 , the unique resulting topology is 2-star.
The following corollary transforms the above conditions in (i) to be independent of the upper bound on the number of nodes that can enter the network. We define base graph of a network formation process as the graph from which the process starts. The conditions derived for the formation of the above networks are obtained starting from the graph consisting of a single node (corresponding to the base case of formation of a network with n = 2). Now for certain topologies to be well-defined, it is required that the network has a certain minimum number of nodes. For instance, for a network to have a well-defined k-star topology, it should consist of at least 2k nodes (complete network on k centers with one leaf node connected to each center). So it is reasonable to consider this network of 2k nodes as a base graph for forming a k-star network. Moreover, in case of some topologies (under a given utility model), the conditions required for its formation on discretely small number of nodes, may be inconsistent with that required on arbitrarily large number of nodes. We will now see that, under the proposed network formation and utility models, k-star (k ≥ 3) is one such topology; and a way to circumvent this problem is to start the network formation process from the aforementioned base graph.
Note that in a real-world network, the upper bound on the number of nodes is unknown to the network owner. So it is essential that, irrespective of the number of nodes, the desired topology is formed and is stable. That is, the conditions on the network must be set such that the entire family of networks having that topology, is stable.
Lemma 1
Under the proposed utility model, for the entire family of k-star networks (given some k ≥ 3) to be pairwise stable, it is necessary that γ = 0 and c = b 1 − b 3 .
It can be seen that the conditions necessary for the family of k-star networks to be pairwise stable (Lemma 1) are sufficient conditions for the formation of a 2-star network uniquely, when b 2 −b 3 < c 0 < b 2 −b 4 (Corollary 2). When c 0 < b 2 −b 3 , these conditions γ = 0 and c = b 1 − b 3 , are sufficient for the formation of a star topology uniquely (Proposition 1). When b 2 − b 4 < c 0 < b 2 , these necessary conditions form a cycle among the initially entered nodes, but fails to form a clique among k nodes even as more nodes enter the network, thus making it inconsistent with the k-star topology. It can be similarly seen that for other values of c 0 including the boundary cases c 0 = b 2 − b 3 and c 0 = b 2 − b 4 , the network so formed is not consistent with k-star topology for any k ≥ 3. So we have that, under the proposed network formation and utility models, with the requirement that the entire family be pairwise stable, no k-star network (given some k ≥ 3) can be formed starting with a network consisting of a single node.
A reasonable solution to overcome this problem is to start the network formation process from some other base graph. Such a graph can be obtained by external methods such as providing additional incentives to its nodes. For initializing the formation of k-star, as mentioned earlier, the base graph can be taken to be the complete network on the k centers, with the centers connected to one leaf node each. As the base graph consists of 2k nodes, the induction starts with the base case for formation of k-star network with n = 2k + 1. 
Intuition Behind the Sufficient Conditions
The network entry fee has an impact on the resulting topology as seen from the above propositions. For instance, in Propositions 1 and 3, the intervals spanned by the values of c and γ may intersect, but the values of network entry factor c 0 span mutually exclusive intervals separated at (1 − γ)(b 2 − b 3 ). In case of star, c 0 is low and so a newly entering node can afford to connect to the center, which in general, has very high degree. In case of bipartite Turán graph, it is important to ensure that the sizes of the two partitions are as equal as possible. As c 0 is high, a newly entering node connects to a node with a lower degree (whenever applicable), that is, to a node that belongs to the partition with more number of nodes. Hence the newly entering node potentially becomes a part of the partition with fewer number of nodes, thus maintaining a balance between the sizes of the two partitions. In case of k-star, as the objective is to ensure that a newly entering node connects to a node with moderate degree, the network entry factor is not so high that a newly entering node prefers connecting to a leaf node and not so low that it prefers connecting to a center with the highest degree. This intuition is clearly reflected in Propositions 4 and 5 where c 0 takes intermediate values. In general, network entry factor c 0 plays an important role in dictating the degree distribution of the resulting network; a higher value of c 0 lays the foundation for formation of a more regular graph.
As c increases, the desirability of a node to form links decreases. This is clear from Proposition 2 which says that, as c decreases, nodes would create more links, hence effectively reducing the network diameter. In particular, a complete network is formed when the costs of maintaining links is extremely low, as reflected in Corollary 1. The remaining topologies are formed in the intermediate ranges of c.
From Propositions 3, 4 and 5, it can be seen that the feasibility of a network being formed depends on the values of γ as well, which arises owing to contrasting densities of connections in a network. For instance, in a bipartite Turán network, nodes belonging to different partitions are densely connected with each other, while that within the same partition are not connected at all. Similarly, in a k-star network, there is an extreme contrast in the densities of connections (dense amongst centers and sparse for leaf nodes).
Connection to Efficiency
We now analyze efficiency of the considered networks. As the derived conditions are sufficient, there may exist other sets of conditions that uniquely result in a given topology. We analyze the efficiency assuming that the networks are formed using the derived conditions.
From Equation (1), the intermediation rents are transferable among the nodes, and so do not affect the efficiency of a network. Furthermore, the network entry fee is paid by any node at most once, and so does not account for efficiency in the long run. So the expression for efficiency of a network is
The following result follows from the analysis by Narayanam and Narahari [28] . The null network in the proposed model of recursive network formation corresponds to a single node to which no other node prefers to connect, and so the network does not grow.
Proposition 6
Based on the derived sufficient conditions, null network, star network, and complete network are efficient.
Proof It is easy to see that irrespective of the value of c 0 , if c > b 1 , no node, external to the network, connects to the only node in the network and hence, does not enter the network. Such a network is trivially efficient as in the range c > b 1 , it is a star of one node and also a null network. It is also clear that the star network and the complete network are efficient as the conditions on c from Proposition 1 and Corollary 1, respectively, form a subset of the range of c in which these topologies are respectively efficient.
It can be seen that when the number of nodes in the network is small, the absolute difference between the efficiency of the resulting network and that of the efficient network is also small, and hence the network owner will not be too concerned about the efficiency of the network. So for the following propositions, we make a reasonable assumption that the number of nodes in the network is sufficiently large.
Proposition 7
Based on the derived sufficient conditions, for sufficiently large number of nodes, the efficiency of a bipartite Turán network is half of that of the efficient network in the worst case and the network is close to being efficient in the best case.
Proof
From Lemma 2, star network is efficient in the range of c derived in Proposition 3. So, to get the efficiency of the bipartite Turán network relative to the star network, we divide the above expression by the sum of utilities of nodes in a star network, which is
Using the assumption that µ is large and the fact from the derived sufficient conditions that b 2 is comparable to b 1 − c, it can be shown that the efficiency relative to the star network, approximately is Proposition 8 Based on the derived sufficient conditions, for sufficiently large number of nodes, the efficiency of a k-star network is 1 k of that of the efficient network in the worst case and the network is close to being efficient in the best case.
Proof As µ is large, in particular, µ >> k (not necessarily >> k 2 ), µ can be assumed to be divisible by k without loss of accuracy. The sum of utilities of nodes in such a k-star network is approximately
From Lemma 2, star network is efficient in the range of c derived in Propositions 4 and 5. So, to get the efficiency of the k-star network relative to the star network, we divide the above expression by Expression (7). Using the assumption that µ is large and the fact from the derived sufficient conditions that b 2 and b 3 are comparable to b 1 − c, it can be shown that the efficiency relative to the star network, approximately is
. As b 3 is bounded by 0 and b 2 , the efficiency of k-star is bounded by 1 k and 1 of that of the star network.
Deviation from the Derived Sufficient Conditions:
A Simulation Study
We have derived sufficient conditions under which various network topologies uniquely emerge. In this section, we investigate the robustness of the derived sufficient conditions by studying the deviation in network topology when there is a slight deviation in these sufficient conditions. This problem is of practical interest since it may be difficult to maintain the conditions on a network throughout its formation process. We use the notion of graph edit distance (GED) [10] to measure the deviation in network topology.
Definition 7
Given two graphs g and h having same number of nodes, the graph edit distance between them is the minimum number of link additions and deletions required to transform g into a graph that is isomorphic to h.
Computation of Graph Edit Distance
The problem of computing GED between two graphs is NP-hard, in general [35] . However, we can exploit structural properties of certain graphs to compute GED between them and other graphs, in polynomial time; we state three such results.
Theorem 1
The graph edit distance between a graph g and a star graph with same number of nodes as g, is µ + ξ − 2∆ − 1, where µ and ξ are the number of nodes and edges in g, respectively, and ∆ is the highest degree in g.
Proof While transforming g into a corresponding star graph, we need to map one node of g to the center while the others to the leaf nodes. Let d be the degree of the node which is mapped to the center. In order to transform g into a star graph, the node mapped to the center must be connected to µ − 1 nodes. So the number of edges to be added is (µ − 1) − d. Also all edges connecting any two nodes, that are mapped to the leaf nodes, must be deleted, that is, all edges except the ones incident to the node mapped to the center, must be removed. These account for ξ − d edges. Thus, total number of edges to be added and deleted is µ + ξ − 2d − 1. This is minimized when d = ∆.
Theorem 2
The graph edit distance between a graph g and a complete graph with same number of nodes as g, is
− ξ, where µ and ξ are the number of nodes and edges in g, respectively.
Proof Graph g can be transformed into the corresponding complete graph in minimum number of steps by adding the edges which are absent.
Theorem 3 There exists an O(µ k+2 ) polynomial time algorithm to compute the graph edit distance between a graph g and a k-star graph with same number of nodes as g, where µ is the number of nodes in g.
We provide the proof of Theorem 3 in Appendix F.
Simulation Setup
In order to study the robustness of the derived sufficient conditions, we observed the effects of deviation from these conditions, on the resulting networks, using GED as the measure of topology deviation. We first observed the effect when the conditions were made to deviate throughout the network formation process. The results were, however, uninteresting since the deviation from the sufficient conditions for the formation of one topology, lead to the formation of a completely different topology. A primary reason for such observations is that, under the deviated conditions, some other networks are pairwise stable and these networks have a very different topology than the desired one. In some cases, these deviated conditions were sufficient conditions for other topologies, which were, however, not the desired ones.
In fact, it is unreasonable to assume that the conditions remain deviated throughout the entire network formation process. It is possible that the conditions deviate at some point of time, but the network owner will observe the resulting network under such deviations and take necessary actions to rectify this problem. This lets us introduce the concept of dynamic conditions on the network.
In simulations, we assume that the conditions deviate during the entry of a new node and remain deviated throughout the evolution of the network until it reaches pairwise stability. Once stability is reached, the network owner observes the deviation of the network from the desired one, and takes actions to restore the original conditions. As it is undesirable for the network to remain stagnant, any node which wants to enter the deviated network next, is allowed to do so immediately, and the original conditions take effect during the entry of such a node and evolution thereafter.
We observe how the topology deviates when the conditions deviate, and if, how, and when the topology is restored, once the sufficient conditions are restored. We also observe the values within the sufficient conditions which are more robust than others, that is, when the conditions are restored to these values, the topology is restored at the earliest.
For simulations, we set the benefit parameters as per the symmetric connections model [21] , that is, we set b i = δ i , where δ ∈ (0, 1); we set δ = 0.8 in our simulations. We consider three types of values within the sufficient conditions, namely, {low(L), moderate(M ), high(H)} for each of the parameters c, c 0 and γ (whenever applicable) and observe the combination of their values which are the most robust to deviations. In our simulation study, low values correspond to value around the lower 10% of the range in sufficient conditions, moderate to around 50% mark, and high to around higher 10%. Also, for each combination, we run the network formation process several times in order to account for the effects of randomization in the order in which nodes take decisions.
Owing to sequential entry of nodes, there is an inherent ordering on nodes and they can be numbered from 1 to the current number of nodes in the network, in the order in which they enter. We call the node number at which the sufficient conditions deviate, as the deviation node. The sufficient conditions are restored during the entry of the node immediately following the deviation node. We say that the deviation from sufficient conditions on a parameter is negative if the deviated value of the parameter is less than its lower bound in the sufficient conditions, and positive if its deviated value is greater than its upper bound. In our simulation study, the amount of deviation for each parameter was 2% of the length of its range in sufficient conditions. The results observed for 5% and 10% deviations were almost same. For parameters whose range in sufficient conditions is a singleton, the results were studied for an absolute deviation of 0.01 on the scale where b i = 0.8 i . 
Simulation Results
We observe the effects of deviation from the derived sufficient conditions for c and c 0 on the resulting network. The observations can be primarily classified into the following four cases, in the decreasing order of desirability to network owner:
(A) The network does not deviate during the entry and also during the evolution after the entry of deviation node.
(B) The network deviates after the entry of the deviation node, and perhaps remains deviated during the entry and evolution for the entry of nodes following the deviation node, but after a certain number of such node entries, the network regains its original topology.
(C) The network deviates after the entry of the deviation node and remains deviated during the entry and evolution for the entry of nodes following the deviation node; the network does not regain its original topology, but the deviation is constant and so a near-desired topology is obtained.
(D) The network deviates after the entry of the deviation node and the deviation increases monotonically during the entry and evolution for the entry of nodes following the deviation node. Figures 5(a-b) give typical plots of the above four cases. The plots are split into two parts for clarity. Result (A) is the most desirable but can be obtained only for some particular deviation nodes depending on the topology for which the sufficient conditions are derived. Result (B) is very common and this is the result the network owner should be looking at. Result (C) is good from a practical viewpoint as the resulting network need not be exactly the desired one, but it may still serve the purpose almost entirely. Result (D) is the one that any network owner should avoid.
Recall that c is the cost incurred by a node in order to maintain a link with each of its immediate neighbors. So as c increases, the desirability of a node to form links decreases. Also as discussed earlier, a higher value of network entry factor c 0 lays the foundation for formation of a more regular graph. In general, it plays an important role in dictating the degree distribution of the resulting network. In what follows, we study the effects of all valid deviations from sufficient conditions on cost parameters c and c 0 , on the resulting network. In the tables that follow, if there were very few instances in which the network did not deviate, we ignore them since such cases are remote when nodes take decisions in some particular order. For observing deviations from k-star topology (k ≥ 3), the network is assumed to start with the corresponding base graph consisting of 2k nodes as discussed earlier.
Enlisted are the major findings of the simulations:
• Certain values of parameters within the derived sufficient conditions may be more robust than others, that is, the value to which the conditions are restored during the entry of the node immediately following the entry of the deviation node, may directly affect the restoration of the topology.
• Network with certain number of nodes may be bottleneck for the range of sufficient conditions (can be seen from the derivations of these conditions). In such cases, the topology deviates only for discretely few deviation nodes, while it does not for others. So the network owner may relax the conditions for most of the network formation process.
• The sufficient conditions on c are more sensitive than those on c 0 , that is, the network deviates more from the desired topology when the value of c deviates than when the value of c 0 deviates by similar margins.
• Results obtained owing to deviation from sufficient conditions during the entry of a deviation node may be very different from that obtained owing to deviation during the entry of some other deviation node.
• It may be possible to uniquely form some interesting topologies which may not be feasible using any static sufficient conditions.
• In most scenarios, the order in which nodes take decisions plays an important role in deciding the resulting topology. Deviations from sufficient conditions may cause large deviations from the desired topology due to some ordering, while no deviation at all due to some other.
The reader should note the difference in labels on the X and Y axes of the different plots in this paper.
Results for Deviation with Respect to c
Negative deviation of c from sufficient conditions for star network:
These results are shown qualitatively in Table 1 and quantitatively in Figure 6 conditions were deviated at a given deviation node. For deviation nodes 2 and 3, no deviation in network was observed. For other deviation nodes, Table 1 shows the type of result obtained owing to deviation from sufficient conditions on c at a deviation node, following which, the values of γ, c 0 and c are restored to one of {L, M, H}. The results are invariant with respect to the restored value of c 0 . The table shows that γ = L coupled with c = H, and γ = M coupled with c = M or H, give the best results, where the star topology is restored as per result (B). γ = L coupled with c = M , and γ = H coupled with c = M or H, give decent results for practical purposes, where a near-star network ( Figure 6(b) ) is obtained as per result (C). c = L is unacceptable and should be avoided by network owner desiring to form a star network, as these values are not robust to deviations from sufficient conditions. Typical observations are shown in Figures 5(a-b) .
Positive deviation of c from sufficient conditions for star network:
No node enters the network at deviation node 2, while for all other deviation nodes, the network does not deviate at all and so result (A) is obtained. The same is clear from the derivation of sufficient conditions for star network, that entry of node 2 is the bottleneck on the upper bound for c (c < b 1 ). So node 2 stays out of the network until the sufficient conditions are restored so that they are favorable for it to enter the network, and hence the network builds up as desired. These results are desirable if the network owner is not too concerned about the delay of node 2's entry into the network. No deviation in network was observed for deviation nodes 2 and 3. For other deviation nodes, deviations in network were observed only during the entry of the deviation node until the stabilization of the network henceforth (Figure 7(a) ). Following this, the sufficient conditions were restored and the network regained the desired topology, after the entry of the node following the deviation node and the stabilization henceforth (result (B)), since the condition c < b 1 − b 2 ensures that the network so formed has diameter at most 1 (Proposition 2), and this is irrespective of the preceding network states.
Negative deviation of c from sufficient conditions for bipartite Turán network:
The desired network was obtained for all deviation nodes except 4, as clear from the derivation of sufficient conditions (the 4-node network is the bottleneck for the lower bound on c).
For deviation node 4, GED between the resulting network of 4 nodes and the corresponding bipartite Turán network was 3. The topology was restored from the entry of the following node onwards in most instances, while it took up to 9 node entries for some.
Positive deviation of c from sufficient conditions for bipartite Turán network:
No deviation in network was observed for deviation nodes 2 to 5. However, deviation node 6 onwards, result (D) was observed regularly for all combinations of values {L, M, H} assigned to γ, c 0 and c, apart from when nodes take decisions in a particular order (in which case, no deviation was observed). For each deviation node 6 onwards, the average GED when the network reached the size of 20 nodes was around 50 and was increasing rapidly as shown in Figure 7 (b). This GED is expected to be more than that in the case of star network, owing to its relatively high edge density. Such deviations from the desired network were observed even for extremely minor deviations of c from the derived sufficient conditions. So restoring the sufficient conditions is not a viable solution for this case. The network owner should ensure that the values of c are on the lower side so as to stay away from the upper bound.
Negative deviation of c from sufficient conditions for k-star network:
GED for all deviation nodes were strictly positive and monotonically increasing, qualitatively looking like result (D) in Figure 5 (a).
Positive deviation of c from sufficient conditions for k-star network:
Result (A) was observed for all deviation nodes except 2k through 3k −1. The reason for the deviation in network for these deviation nodes is that, in the k-star network consisting of number of nodes between 2k and 3k − 1, both inclusive, there exists at least one center with only one leaf node linked to it. When there is a positive deviation of c from the sufficient conditions for k-star network, it is beneficial for any other center to delete link with a center that is linked to only one leaf node, and this link deletion leads to other link alterations among other nodes, thus deviating the network from the desired topology. For deviation nodes 2k through 3k − 1, result (D) was observed consistently, which qualitatively looked like the one in Figure 5 (a).
Results for Deviation with Respect to c 0
Positive deviation of c 0 from sufficient conditions for star network:
These results are shown qualitatively in Table 2 and quantitatively in Figure 8 (a). The graph in Figure 8 (a) plots the deviation from network as observed when the network reached the size of 20 nodes, if the conditions were deviated at a given deviation node. For deviation nodes 2 and 3, no deviation in network was observed. For other deviation nodes, Table 2 shows the type of result obtained owing to deviation from sufficient conditions on c 0 at a deviation node, following which, the values of γ, c 0 and c are restored to one of {L, M, H}. When the sufficient conditions are restored to low values of c after deviating from the sufficient conditions, the resulting network is a (2, n − 2)-complete bipartite network (result (D)) similar to that in Figure 8(b) , where node Y was the original center and the conditions were deviated during entry of node X. Negative deviation of c 0 from sufficient conditions for bipartite Turán network:
The desired network was obtained for all odd numbered deviation nodes and deviation node 2. For deviation node 4, GED between the resulting network of 4 nodes and the corresponding bipartite Turán network was 3. For most instances, the topology was restored from the entry of the following node onwards; but some instances took up to 9 node entries to settle back to a bipartite Turán network (very similar to the case of negative deviation of c). For every even-numbered deviation node n ≥ 4, deviations in network were observed only during the entry of the deviation node until the stabilization of the network henceforth, with GED = n − 1. Following this, the sufficient conditions were restored and the network regained the desired topology, after the entry of the node following the deviation node and the stabilization henceforth. Negative deviation of c 0 from sufficient conditions for k-star network:
For deviation node n such that (n mod k) = 1, the network did not deviate and so result (A) was observed. For all other deviation nodes, result (B) was observed. In general, for deviation node n, GED was observed to be 2, and it took [(k + 1 − z) mod k] node entries for the topology to be restored once the sufficient conditions were restored, where z = (n mod k). Figure 9 (b) shows the result when node X tries to enter the 3-star network consisting of nodes A through J, as the 11 th node, during negative deviation of c 0 . It creates a link with node A instead of either B or C, thus giving GED of 2. Following this, the sufficient conditions are restored and so the following node X + 1 forms links with a lowest degree center, say C; but GED remains 2. Then the next node X + 2 tries to enter, which forms a link with the only lowest degree center B, forming a 3-star network of 13 nodes, thus restoring the topology. In this example, k = 3 and n = 11 and so it takes 2 node entries for the topology to be restored.
Positive deviation of c 0 from sufficient conditions for k-star network:
Let C be a center with the lowest degree and m j be the number of leaf nodes already connected to center j. It can be shown that result (A) will be obtained if the positive deviation of c 0 is less that the threshold:
where n is the deviation node, and I n =pk+1 is 1 if n = pk + 1 for any integer p, else it is 0. If the deviation crossed this threshold in simulations, result (D) was observed consistently, which qualitatively looked like the one in Figure 5 (a). The result is owing to the fact that a high value of c 0 would force a new node to prefer connecting to a leaf node which is linked to a center with the highest degree, rather than any center directly; this leads to other link alterations among other nodes, thus deviating the network from the desired topology.
Conclusion
We proposed a model of recursive network formation where nodes enter a network sequentially, thus triggering evolution each time a new node enters. We considered a sequential move game model with myopic nodes under a very general utility model, and pairwise stability as the equilibrium notion; however the proposed model (Figure 2) is independent of the network evolution model, the equilibrium notion, as well as the utility model. The recursive nature of our model enabled us to analyze the network formation process using an elegant induction-based technique. For each of the relevant topologies, by directing network evolution as desired, we derived sufficient conditions under which that topology uniquely emerges. The derived conditions suggest that conditions on network entry impact degree distribution, while conditions on link costs impact density; also there arise constraints on intermediary rents owing to contrasting densities of connections in the desired topology. We then analyzed the social welfare properties of the considered topologies, and studied the effects of deviating from the derived conditions. Proof The conditions c < b 1 and c 0 ≤ (1 − γ)b 2 ensure that any new node successfully enters the network, that is, it gets a positive utility by doing so, and the node to which it connects to in order to enter the network, also gets a higher utility. Now consider a network where c < b 1 − b d+1 and there exist two nodes, say A and B, which are at a distance x > d from each other. The indirect benefit they get from each other is b x ≤ b d+1 . In the case where there exist essential nodes connecting these nodes, each has to pay an additional rent of γb x . By establishing a connection between them, each node gets an additional direct benefit of b 1 and incurs an additional cost c. Also this connection may decrease the distances between either of these nodes and other nodes, for instance, direct neighbors of node B which were at distance b x−1 , b x or b x+1 from node A, are now at distance min{b 2 , b x−1 }, resulting in increase in indirect benefits for node A.
It can be easily seen that if either (or both) of these nodes acted as an essential node for some pair of nodes, it remains to do so even after the connection is established. Furthermore, it is possible that the established connection shortens the path between this pair, resulting in higher bridging benefits for the node under consideration.
Summing up, by establishing a mutual connection between nodes which are at distance x > d from each other, the overall increase in utility for either node is at least b 1 − c and the overall decrease is at most b d+1 . So the condition sufficient for link creation is b 1 − c > b d+1 . As this is true for any such pair, without loss of generality, the network will evolve until distance between any pair is at most d.
B Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3 For a network with γ <
, the unique resulting topology is a bipartite Turán graph.
Proof We first derive conditions for ensuring pairwise stability of a bipartite Turán network, that is, assuming that such a network is formed, what conditions are required so that there are no incentives for any two unconnected nodes to create a link between them and for any node to delete any of its links. Note that these conditions can be integrated in the later part of the proof within different scenarios that we consider. In what follows, p 1 is the size of the partition constituting the node taking its decision, p 2 is the size of the other partition and n = p 1 + p 2 is the number of nodes in the network. We need to consider cases for some discretely small number of nodes owing to the nature of essential nodes, after which, the analysis holds for arbitrarily large number of nodes. For brevity, we present the analysis for the base case and a generic case in each scenario, omitting presentation of discrete cases.
No two nodes belonging to the same partition should create a link between them: Their utility should not increase by doing so. This is not applicable for n = 2.
which is a weaker condition that Inequality (B.1).
No node should delete its link with any node belonging to the other partition:
That is, their utility should not increase by doing so.
It can be shown that conditions for the discrete cases n = 3, 4, 5 are satisfied by Inequality (B.3).
In the process of formation of a bipartite Turán network, at most four different types of nodes exist at any point in time. For the newly entering node to enter the network: Its utility should be positive after doing so. Also, in case of even n, for the new node to be a part of the smaller partition, its first connection should be a node belonging to the larger partition. So for k = 0, we have For n ≥ 2,
It can be seen that the condition is the strongest when n = 2 whenever
The condition thus becomes c < b 1 which is satisfied by Inequality (B.3).
The utility of a node in the larger partition, whenever applicable, should not decrease after accepting link from the new node:
For n ≥ 5,
The conditions for these as well as the discrete cases n = 3, 4 are satisfied by Inequality (B.3).
The new node should connect to a node in the larger partition, whenever applicable: One way to see this is by ensuring that this strategy strictly dominates connecting to a node in the smaller partition. This scenario arises for even values of n ≥ 4.
An alternative condition would be such that the utility of a node in the smaller partition decreases if it accepts the link from the new node, thus forcing the latter to connect to a node in the other partition. But it can be seen that this condition is inconsistent with Inequality (B.3) and so we use Inequality (B.5) to meet our purpose.
Type I node should prefer connecting to a Type III node, if any, than remaining in its current state: For k ≥ 2, this scenario does not arise for n < 6. For n ≥ 6,
Now for k = 1, this scenario does not arise for n = 2, 3. For n ≥ 4,
Note that as n ≥ 4, we have m 1 ≥ 2 and m 2 ≥ 1 and so the above condition is weaker that Inequality (B.6). It is also necessary that utility of Type III node does not decrease on accepting link from Type I node. In fact, when the former gets a chance to move, we derive conditions so that it also volunteers to create a link with the later.
The utility of Type III node should increase if it successfully creates a link with Type I node: When k = 1, the case does not arise for n = 2, 3. For n ≥ 6,
The conditions obtained from discrete cases n = 4, 5 are weaker than this one. For k ≥ 2, this case does not arise for n < 6. For n ≥ 6,
The conditions for all cases are satisfied by Inequality (B.6).
Type III node should not delete its link with Type IV node: This can be assured if this strategy is dominated by its strategy of forming a link with Type I node. This scenario does not arise for n = 2, 3. The conditions for the discrete cases n = 4, 5, 6 are weaker than that for n ≥ 7. For n ≥ 7,
For k ≥ 2, the cases applicable are n ≥ 6. The condition for discrete case n = 6 is weaker than the following condition. For n ≥ 7,
Hence, all conditions for this scenario are satisfied by Inequality (B.6).
Type III node should prefer connecting to Type I node than to another Type III node: This does not arise for n < 6. When k = 1, For n ≥ 6,
which is always true. For k ≥ 2, For n ≥ 6,
which is always true.
Type IV node should not delete its link with Type III node: That is, its utility should not increase by doing so. This does not arise for n < 4. For n ≥ 7,
The conditions for discrete cases n = 4, 5, 6 are weaker than the above condition. For k ≥ 2, the new cases are n ≥ 6, where the discrete case n = 6 result in conditions weaker than the following one. For n ≥ 7,
It can be seen that all conditions of this scenario are satisfied by Inequality (B.6).
Type IV node should also not break its link with Type II node: That is, its utility should not increase by doing so. For k = 1, For n ≥ 6,
The discrete cases n = 3, 4, 5 result in weaker conditions than this. For k ≥ 2, For n ≥ 6,
The conditions are satisfied by Inequality (B.6).
Type I node should not propose a link to a Type IV node: One way is to ensure that this strategy of Type I node is dominated by its strategy to propose a link to a Type III node. It can be seen that for k ≥ 2 and n ≥ 6, this translates to
which is not true for m 1 > k. So we look at the alternative condition that the utility of Type IV node decreases if it accepts the link from Type I node, and as Type I node computes this decrease in utility, it will not propose a link to Type IV node. First, we consider k = 1. The discrete case n = 4 gives the following condition.
The other discrete cases n = 3, 5 result in weaker conditions than the above. For n ≥ 6,
which is a weaker condition than Inequality (B.7). Now for k ≥ 2, n = 4, 5 correspond to pairwise stability conditions and cases n < 4 are not applicable. For n ≥ 6,
which is satisfied by Inequality (B.7).
Type IV node should not propose a link to Type I node: This scenario is essentially equivalent to the previous one scenario of utility of Type IV node decreasing due to link with Type I node, with the equalities permitted. So these result in weaker and hence no additional conditions.
Type III node should not propose a link to Type II node: One way is to ensure that for Type III node, connecting to Type II node is strictly dominated by connecting to Type I node. It can be seen that for k ≥ 2 and n ≥ 6, this translates to
which gives 0 > 0. So we need to use the alternative condition that the utility of Type II node decreases on accepting link from Type III node. For k = 1,
which is same as Inequality (B.7).
which is a weaker condition than Inequality (B.7). Now for k ≥ 2, the only new case is the following. For n ≥ 6,
Type II node should not propose a link with Type III node: This is essentially equivalent to the above scenario of utility of Type II node decreasing due to link with Type III node, with the equalities permitted. So these result in weaker and hence no additional conditions.
No Type II node should delete link with Type IV node: First, we consider k = 1. For n ≥ 7,
This as well as all discrete cases n < 7 are satisfied by Inequality (B.6). For k ≥ 2, the cases of n = 4, 5 correspond to pairwise stability condition that we have already considered, while cases n < 4 are not applicable. For n ≥ 6,
which is satisfied by Inequality (B.6).
Two Type IV nodes should not create a mutual link: That is their utilities should not increase by doing so. When k = 1, it is not applicable for n < 5. Also, the discrete case n = 5 results in the same condition as below. For n ≥ 6,
For k ≥ 2, n = 5 corresponds to pairwise stability condition. For n ≥ 6,
These are weaker conditions than Inequality (B.7).
No two Type II nodes should create a link between themselves: This only applies to k ≥ 2. Also n = 4, 5 result in pairwise stability condition. For n ≥ 6,
which is a weaker condition than Inequality (B.7).
Link between Type I node and Type II node should not be deleted: It is clear that it will not be deleted as such a link is just formed with no other changes in the network.
Inequalities (B.6) and (B.7) are stronger conditions than Inequalities (B.1), (B.2) and (B.3). Furthermore, for non-zero range of c, from Inequalities (B.6) and (B.7), we have
The required sufficient conditions are obtained by combining Inequalities (B.4), (B.5), (B.6), (B.7) and (B.8).
C Proof of Proposition 4
and b 1 − b 2 + γb 2 + γλ ≤ c < b 1 , the unique resulting topology is a 2-star.
Proof We derive sufficient conditions for the formation of a 2-star network by forming its skeleton of four nodes first, that is, a network with two interconnected centers, connected to one leaf node each. Once this is formed, we ensure that a newly entering node connects to the center with fewer number of leaf nodes, whenever applicable, so as to maintain the load balance between the two centers.
Forming the skeleton of the 2-star network: With one node in the network, the second node should successfully create a link with the former. The condition for ensuring this is
For the third node to enter, it should propose a link to any of the two existing nodes in the network, that is, it should get a positive utility by doing so. This gives
This is ensured by Inequality (C.1) and
Also the existing node to which the link is proposed, should accept it, that is, its utility should not decrease by doing so.
which is a weaker condition than Inequality (C.1). We have to also ensure that this Vshaped network of three nodes is pairwise stable. It is clear that no node will delete any of its links since such a link is just formed. However, we have to ensure that the two leaf nodes of this V-shaped network do not create a mutual link. This can be ensured by
Following this, the fourth node should propose a link to one of the two leaf node in the V-shaped network. For ensuring that its utility increases by doing so,
which is satisfied by Inequalities (C.1) and (C.2). Also, it should prefer connecting to a leaf node than the center of the V-shaped network, that is,
The leaf node to which the link is proposed, should accept the link.
which is satisfied by Inequality (C.1). We have to also ensure that this network is pairwise stable. We derive sufficient conditions for pairwise stability of a general 2-star network with number of nodes n ≥ 4, which includes the sufficient conditions for pairwise stability of the skeleton thus formed.
Let the centers of the 2-star be labeled C 1 and C 2 . Also, let the number of leaf nodes connected to C 1 be m 1 and that connected to C 2 be m 2 .
Leaf nodes that are connected to different centers, should not create a mutual link: This scenario is valid for n ≥ 4. Without loss of generality, for a leaf node connected to C 1 ,
which is same as Inequality (C.4).
The new node should not stay out of the network: Its utility should be positive when it enters the network by connecting to the center with less number of leaf nodes, whenever applicable.
It can be easily seen that, as m 1 , m 2 ≥ 1, the above is always true when Inequalities (C.1) and (C.4) are satisfied.
The center with less number of leaf nodes, whenever applicable, should accept the link from the newly entering node: The condition c < b 1 in Inequality (C.1) is sufficient to ensure this.
The newly entering node should prefer connecting to the center with less number of leaf nodes, whenever applicable, over connecting to any leaf node: It is easy to see that, as b 3 > b 4 , whenever the number of leaf nodes connected to the centers are different, a newly entering node prefers connecting to a leaf node connected to C 1 over that connected to C 2 (assuming m 1 = m 2 + 1). Hence we have to ensure that connecting to the center with less number of leaf nodes, whenever applicable, is more beneficial to a newly entering node than connecting to a leaf node that is connected to C 1 . Without loss of generality, we want the new node to prefer connecting to C 2 (irrespective of whether m 1 = m 2 or m 1 = m 2 + 1).
The conditions on c can be obtained from Inequalities (C.1), (C.3), (C.5), and either (C.6) or (C.7). Suppose we choose Inequality (C.7) over Inequality (C.6). So, for c to have a non-empty range of values, from Inequalities (C.1) and (C.7), we must have
As γ < 1, the above is equivalent to
which is not true for arbitrarily large values of σ. So we cannot use Inequality (C.7). Suppose we choose Inequality (C.6). So, for c to have a non-empty range of values, from Inequalities (C.1) and (C.6), we must have
Lemma 1 Under the proposed utility model, for the entire family of k-star networks (given some k ≥ 3) to be pairwise stable, it is necessary that γ = 0 and c = b 1 − b 3 .
Proof We consider two scenarios sufficient to prove this.
I) No center should delete its link with any other center: Here, only one case is enough to be considered, that is, when each center has just one leaf node, since in all other cases, the benefits obtained by each center from the connection with other centers is at least as much. For k = 3,
II) Leaf nodes of different centers should not form a link with each other: Consider a leaf node. Let m i be the number of leaf nodes connected to the center to which the leaf node under consideration, is connected. For k ≥ 3,
The Proof It is clear from Lemma 1 that under the proposed utility model, for the family of k-star networks (k ≥ 3) to be pairwise stable, it is necessary that γ = 0 and c = b 1 − b 3 in order to stabilize all possible k-star networks for a given k, and hence forms the necessary part of sufficient conditions for the formation of a k-star network. Hence, for the rest of this proof, we will assume that γ = 0 (E.1) and
Without loss of generality, assume some indexing over the k centers from 1 to k. Let C i be the center with index i and m i be the number of leaf nodes it is linked to. Also we start with a base graph in which every center is linked to one leaf node and the number of leaf nodes linked to each center increases as the process goes on. So we have,
For the newly entering node to propose entering the network: Our objective is to ensure that the newly entering node connects to a center with the least number of leaf nodes, in order to maintain balance over the number of leaf nodes linked to the centers. Without loss of generality, assume that we want the newly entering node to connect to C 1 . The utility of the newly entering node should be positive after doing so.
Since the minimum value of m i is 1 for any i, the above condition is true if
This is satisfied by Equation (E.2) and
The newly entering node should connect to a center with the least number of leaf nodes, whenever applicable: This case does not arise when all centers have the same number of leaf nodes. Moreover, the way we direct the evolution of the network, the number of leaf nodes connected to any two centers differs by at most one. Without loss of generality, assume that we want the newly entering node to connect to C 1 . Consider a center C p such that m p = m 1 + 1. So the newly entering node should prefer connecting to C 1 over connecting to C p .
As m p = m 1 + 1, we have
For a center with the least number of leaf nodes to accept the link from the newly entering node: It can be easily seen that this is ensured by Equation (E.2).
The newly entering node should not connect to any leaf node: It can be easily seen that owing to benefits degrading with distance, for the newly entering node, connecting to any leaf node which is connected to a center with the most number of leaf nodes, strictly dominates connecting to any other leaf node, whenever applicable. So it is sufficient to ensure that the newly entering node does not connect to any leaf node which is connected to a center with the most number of leaf nodes. This can be done by ensuring that for the newly entering node, connecting to a center with the least number of leaf nodes strictly dominates connecting to any leaf node which is connected to a center with the most number of leaf nodes. Say we want the newly entering node to prefer connecting to center C 1 over a leaf node that is linked to center C p . Now that the newly entering node enters in a way such that k-star network is formed, we have to ensure that no further modifications of links occur so that the network thus formed, is pairwise stable.
For centers and the corresponding leaf nodes to not delete the link between them: It can be easily seen that c < b 1 , a weaker condition than Equation (E.2), is a sufficient condition to ensure this.
No center should delete its link with any other center: This is ensured by the inequalities in the proof of Lemma 1, which are weaker than Equations (E.1) and (E.2).
Leaf nodes of a center should not form a link with each other: The net benefit that a leaf node would get by forming such a link should be non-positive.
which is satisfied by Equation (E.2).
Leaf nodes of different centers should not form a link with each other: This is ensured by the inequality in the proof of Lemma 1, which is weaker than Equations (E.1) and (E.2).
Link between a center and a leaf node of any other center should not be created: Let C i be the center under consideration and the leaf node under consideration be linked to C j (j = i). There are two ways to ensure this. First is to ensure that a center neither proposes nor accepts a link with a leaf node of any other center. This mathematically is An alternative to this condition is to ensure that a leaf node neither proposes nor accepts a link with a center to which it is not connected, but since this condition is already satisfied by Equation (E.2), this alternative need not be considered.
Equations (E.1), (E.2), (E.3), (E.4) and (E.5) give the required sufficient conditions for the k-star network topology.
F Proof of Theorem 3
Proof Assume that the mapping of the k centers of the k-star network to the nodes in g, is known. Let us call these nodes of g as pseudo-centers. The graph edit distance can be computed by taking the minimum number of edge edit operations over all possible mappings. In a k-star graph, each node, other than centers, is allotted to exactly one center. Hence, our objective is to allot nodes, other than pseudo-centers, (call them pseudo-leaves) in g to pseudo-centers such that the graph edit distance is minimized. Let µ and ξ be the number 1 1 1 1 t Figure 10 : Formulation of graph edit distance between graph g (µ = 10) and a 3-star graph with same number of nodes as g, as a max-flow problem of nodes and edges in g, respectively. Let vacancy of a pseudo-center at any point of time be defined as the maximum number of nodes that can be allotted to it, given the current allotment. Note that if µ is not a multiple of k, the vacancy of a pseudo-center depends not only on the number of pseudo-leaves allotted to it, but also on the number of pseudo-leaves allotted to other pseudo-centers. It is clear that if the mapping of the k centers is known, for transforming g to a corresponding k-star, it is necessary that all missing links between any two pseudo-centers be added (let β 1 be the number of such links) and all existing links between any two pseudoleaves be deleted (let β 2 be the number of such links). The only other links that need to be computed for additions or deletions, in order to minimize graph edit distance, are those interlinking pseudo-leaves with pseudo-centers. The number of links that already interlink pseudo-leaves with pseudo-centers in g is β 3 = (ξ −β 2 −( k 2 −β 1 )). Say the number of these edges that are retained during the transformation to k-star, is f , that is, exactly f pseudoleaves are allotted a pseudo-center and (µ−k−f ) are not. So the number of edges interlinking pseudo-leaves with pseudo-centers, that are deleted during the transformation, is (β 3 − f ). Also, the number of edges to be added in order to allot the pseudo-leaves, that are not allotted to any pseudo-center, to some pseudo-center having a positive vacancy, is (µ−k −f ). So the number of edge edit operations is (β 1 +β 2 +β 3 +µ−k −2f ) = (µ+ξ +2β 1 − k 2 (k +1)−2f ). Given a mapping of the k centers, the only variable in this expression is f . So in order to minimize its value, we need to maximize the number of edges interlinking pseudo-leaves and pseudo-centers, that remain intact after the transformation to k-star. We now address this problem of maximizing f .
Let the number of nodes in g be µ = pk + q where p and q are integers such that p ≥ 0 and 1 ≤ q < k. In a k-star graph with µ nodes, q centers are linked to p leaf nodes and the remaining k − q are linked to p − 1 leaf nodes. So for transforming g to a corresponding k-star graph, q pseudo-centers should be allotted p pseudo-leaves and the remaining k − q should be allotted p−1. So, at most q pseudo-centers should be allotted p nodes, that is, the vacancy of at most q pseudo-centers should be p, while that of the remaining k − q should be p − 1. In other words, to start with, the sum of vacancies of any q + 1 pseudo-centers should be at most (q + 1)p − 1.
The above problem can be formulated as an application of max-flow in a directed network. Figure 10 shows the formulation for a graph g with 10 nodes and a 3-star graph, where p = 3 and q = 1. The edges directing from the source node s to the left k nodes in Box 1 (here k = 3) and those in Boxes 1, 2 and 3, formulate the vacancy of each of these pseudo-centers to be p. Boxes 1, 2 and 3 formulate the constraint that the sum of vacancies of any q + 1 pseudo-centers should be at most (q + 1)p − 1. The rightmost Box 4 is obtained by considering edges only interlinking any pseudo-centers (left nodes) and pseudo-leaves (right nodes).
As all the edges have integer capacities, the Ford-Fulkerson algorithm constructs an integer maximum flow. The number of constraints concerning the sum of vacancies of pseudo-centers is (k + 1) − 2f ), is minimized since f is maximized. The time complexity of the above algorithm is dominated by the max-flow algorithm. The above analysis was assuming that the mapping of the k centers of the k-star network to the nodes in G, is known. The graph edit distance can, hence, be computed by taking the minimum edit distance over all 
